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COMMENT
U.S. WETLANDS POLICY, LEGISLATION, AND CASE LAW AS APPLIED TO
THE WISE USE CONCEPT OF THE

RAMSAR CONVENTION
INTRODUCTION

Wetlands provide several important ecological and environmental functions, including habitat and nutrients for many animal and
plant species, natural resources such as fish, shellfish, and timber,
protection against flooding and erosion, and a natural water purification system. In addition, wetlands provide recreational, educational,
and research opportunities, and a tremendous source of genetic diversity.' The international community has recognized the important ecological and environmental role of wetlands by implementing the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Especially As Waterfowl Habitat of 1971, commonly known as the Ramsar Convention.2 The U.S. became a contracting party to the Ramsar Convention

in 1986?
Significantly, over fifty percent of the 221 million acres of wetlands in the lower forty-eight states of the U.S. has been lost over the
last 200 years.4 Only since the 1970s have U.S. policymakers come

1

See Alexandre S. Timoshenko, Protection of Wetlands by InternationalLmv, 5 PACE
L. REV. 463 (1988) (explaining that wetlands regulate the hydraulic cycle, provide genetic diversity and are a habitat for indigenous and migratory birds). See also Michael G. Le Desma, A
Sound of Thunder: Problems and Prospects in Wetland Mitigation Banking, 19 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 497, 497-98 (1994) (describing the "functional value" of wetlands as including: (1)
conveyance and storage of floodwater; (2) prevention of erosion and saltwater intrusion; (3)
sediment control; (4) habitat for fish, shellfish, waterfowl, and other wildlife; (5) habitat for
endangered species; (6) recreation; (7) water supply and water quality maintenance; (8) food
production; (9) timber production; (10) archeological research; (11) educational and research
value; and (12) open space and aesthetic value).
2
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Feb. 2, 1971, 11 I.L.M. 963 [hereinafter Ramsar Convention].
3
4

id.

See WHITE HOUSE OFF. ON ENVTL. POL'Y, PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS: A
FAIR, FLEXIBLE, AND EFFECTIVE APPROACH (1993), LEXIS, U.S. News File [hereinafter PROTECT1NG AMERICA'S WETLANDS]. See also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No.
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to realize the important role wetlands play in our environment.
However, since 1972 the U.S. has made significant strides in protecting wetlands, primarily through section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
This Comment demonstrates that current U.S. wetlands management
practices substantially satisfy the "wise use" requirement of the Ramsar Convention and can serve as a potential model for other countries.
Part I outlines the Ramsar Convention and the wise use concept;
Part II reviews U.S. wetlands policy, legislation, and case law; Part III
examines mitigation banking and in-lieu-fee arrangements for compensatory mitigation; Part IV analyzes the consistency of the U.S.
wetlands policy, legislation and case law with the wise use concept;
and Part V makes recommendations for improving this consistency.
I. THE RAMSAR CONVENTION AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE WISE USE
CONCEPT

The Ramsar Convention creates an international framework for
protecting wetlands. According to the Preamble, the Contracting Parties recognize "the interdependence of man and his environment,"
that wetlands are a significant "economic, cultural, scientific and recreational" resource and, as a result, there is a desire "to stem the progressive encroachment on and loss of wetlands now and in the future."'6 The treaty, negotiated in Ramsar, Iran, was signed in 1971 in
response to apprehension regarding the declining migratory waterfowl
populations and their wetlands habitat in the 1960s. 7 The treaty entered into force in 1975.8 Interestingly, the initiative behind the development of the Ramsar Convention was the result of efforts of nongovernmental organizations. 9
First, the convention provides a broad definition of wetlands. 10
Article 1(1) defines wetlands as "areas of marsh, fen, peatland or water, whether natural or artificial, permanent or temporary, with water
GAO/RCED-98-150, REPORT TO CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON VA, HUD, AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES, COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, U.S. SENATE (1998), LEXIS, U.S. News File

[hereinafter GAO REPORT] (asserting that Fish and Wildlife Service estimates show more than
half of the wetlands acreage present during colonial times have been destroyed due to a lack of
understanding about the important functions wetlands provide).
5 See Le Desma, supra note 1, at 497 (noting that until the mid-1970s both government
and the public viewed wetlands as a nuisance to be drained and filled for development).
6 Ramsar Convention, supranote 2, at 963.
7 See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
1058 (1998).
8

Id.

9 See id. (asserting that the efforts of a non-governmental organization, Wetlands International, to convene international meetings on the loss of migratory waterfowl and their habitats
were the driving force behind the adoption the Ramsar Convention).
"0 See id. (explaining that the Ramsar Convention's expansive definition of wetlands
includes several types of "wetlands" not typically considered to be wetlands).
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that is static or flowing, fresh, brackish or salt, including areas of mafine water the depth of which at low tide does not exceed six metres."" Secondly, Article 2 requires Contracting Parties to list at least
one wetland of international importance located within their territory.12 Listing enhances a wetland's protected status and ensures
commitment to its protection.13 Finally, Article 3(1) requires that
Contracting Parties "shall formulate and implement their planning so
as to promote the conservation of the wetlands included in the List,
14
and as far as possible the wise use of wetlands in their territory."'
This obligation is often overlooked. The wise use requirement applies to all wetlands located in a Contracting Party's borders, including listed and non-listed wetlands. While the treaty did not define
wise use,' 5 subsequent efforts have resulted in an evolving process to
characterize its meaning.
In 1987, at the Third Meeting of the Conference of Contracting
Parties, a Working Group on Criteria and Wise Use was established.
At this meeting, the Conference of the parties adopted the following
formal definition of the wise use of wetlands: "The wise use of wetlands is their sustainableutilization for the benefit of humankind in a
way compatible with the maintenance of the natural properties of the
ecosystem."' 6 Sustainable utilization is "human use of a wetland so
that it may yield the greatest continuous benefit to present generations
while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of
future generations. 1 7 In addition, the Working Group was charged
with developing guidance on the implementation of wise use under
Article 3(1).8
As a result of the Working Group's efforts, Guidelines for the
Implementation of the Wise Use Concept were adopted at the Fourth
Meeting of the Conference of the Contracting Parties that took place

11 See Ramsar Convention, supranote 2, at 963.
12
13

Id.
See HUNTER Er AL., supra note 7, at 1059-60.

14
15

See Ramsar Convention, supra note 2, at 964.
See Tinoshenko, supra note 1, at 467 (explaining that the meaning of wise use as set

forth in Article 3(1) was legally and scientifically unclear). See also THE RAMSAR CONVEN-

TION

ON WETLANDs: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WISE USE

CONCEPT (1993) [hereinafter ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE] (originally adopted as an annex to Resolution 5.6 of the 5th Meeting of the Conference of Contracting Parties in Kushiro, Japan, 1993)
(asserting that in the early years of the treaty, the Wise Use Concept was difficult to employ),
availableat http://www.ramsar.orgtkey-add-guide.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2001).
16 RECOMMENDATIONS OF TiE REGINA, CANADA CONFERENCE: RECOMMENDATION 3.3
ON WISE USE OF WETLANDS (1987), available at http://www.ramsar.org/key._re_3.3.htm (last

visited Jan. 6, 2002).
17 Ld.
18 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REGINA, CANADA CONFERENCE: RECOMMENDATION 3.1
ON THE CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING WETLANDS OF INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE (1987), avail-

able at http://www.ramsar.org/key-ree_3.1.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2002).
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in Montreux, Switzerland. 19 The guidelines assert that implementa-

tion of the wise use concept requires the establishment of national20
wetlands policies, along with the wise use of individual wetlands.
Essential elements of effective national wetlands policies were found
to include:
1. Developing and improving institutional and organizational arrangements to (a) identify how wetlands conservation and protection can be accomplished as part of the
overall environmental planning process, and (b) establish
mechanisms for planning and implementing wetlands
projects that ensure sustainability;
2. Developing and improving national legislation and government policies and applying existing authority to conserve wetlands;
3.

Developing and improving the understanding of wetlands
values of both decision-makers and the public at large in
order to foster the implementation of the wise use concept; and

4. Proper planning at specific wetlands sites including
among other components (a) integration of environmental
concerns, particularly wetlands conservation, before approval of a project; (b) regulation to guard against overuse of wetlands; (c) establishing and implementing periodic revisions of management plans that embrace the perspectives and concerns of local residents.2'
At the 5th Conference of the Contracting Parties in Kushiro, Japan, the Working Group on Criteria and Wise Use published additional guidelines in 1993.2 As part of these expanded guidelines, the
19 THE RAMSAR CONVENTION ON WETLANDS: GUIDELINES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE WISE USE CONCEPT (1990) [hereinafter WISE USE GUIDELINES] (originally adopted as

an annex to Recommendation 4.1 at the 4th Meeting of the Conference of Contracting Parties in
Montreux, Switzerland, 1990), availableat http://www.ramsar.org/key-wiseuse.htm (last modified May 10, 2001).
20 1& See also GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL WETLAND

POLICIES (1999) [hereinafter NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICIES] (adopted as Resolution 7.6 of the
7th Meeting of the Conference of Contracting Parties in San Jose, Costa Rica, 1999) (describing
a national wetland policy as a key component for implementing the wise use concept), available
at http://www.ramsar.org/key-guide-nwpe.htm (Feb. 15, 2001).
I WISE USE GUIDELINES, supranote 19, at 1-3.
22

See ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE, supranote 15, at 1.
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Working Group identified several impediments to the implementation
of a national wetlands policy and recommended means to overcome
them. Obstacles included:
*

*

the absence of institutional frameworks at the national,
regional, and local levels, and policies that discouraged
the wise use of wetlands;
inadequate research and lack of international cooperation,
particularly between neighboring countries for common
or shared wetlands. 23

The 1993 expanded guidelines advocated for the development of
the appropriate institutional infrastructure, and increased involvement
of non-government organizations as part of the process of developing
a national wetlands policy.24 Further, the guidelines recommended
conducting environmental impact assessments to ascertain whether
projects that affect wetlands are compatible with wise use.2 Moreover, the guidelines recommended establishing a permit system for
actions that affect wetlands. In order to accomplish these goals, the
1993 guidance made clear that knowledge of wetlands and their functions is needed.26 The necessary steps to acquire the requisite knowledge include the development of a wetlands inventory, research,
monitoring, and training.2 7 The guidance described wetlands inventory development as an evolving long-term process.2 Research
should include a diverse array of efforts to expand knowledge regarding wetlands. 29 Training of policy-makers and field staff is critical to
successfully achieving wise use.30 Finally, the 1993 guidance emphasized the need to educate the public at large regarding wetlands val-

23d.

2s
2

27

l at 4.
Id. at6.
Id.

m Id. at 6-7 (describing a wetlands inventory as a long-term, multi-disciplinary data
collection effort to identify wetlands, their uses, potential and existing problems, and areas of
needed research).
29 Id. at 7-8 (indicating that research involves quantification of wetlands ecological,
social and economic values and functions, identification of sustainable wetlands uses and practices, and development of wetlands restoration methods). See also NATIONAL WETLANDS POLlCIS, supra note 20, at 6 (indicating a current lack of quantified data on wetlands benefits).
30 See ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE, supra note 15, at 8-9 (describing needed training to
include courses on (I) planning, (2) actual wetlands management; and (3) advocacy and enforcement of the wise use concept).
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The guidance goes so far as to assert that most people do not
even know what a wetland is. 32 Development of a national wetlands
policy represents an important step in implementing wise use under
the Ramsar Convention.33
The 1993 guidelines recommended improved management at
specific sites consistent with the wise use concept. In order to accomplish wise use, specific wetlands site management must balance
all uses, including human activities, and must consider local circumstances and existing uses. The 1993 guidance specifies that a welldesigned management plan is comprised of a description of the site,
an understanding of past environmental impacts to wetlands, and a
definition of both the short- and long-term goals of managing the site
and implementation. 34
ues.

31

II. NATIONAL U.S. WETLANDS POLICY, LEGISLATION, AND CASE

LAW
This section outlines the current state of U.S. wetlands management in light of the Ramsar Convention and the wise use concept.
U.S. wetlands management is comprised of three elements: policy and
associated infrastructure, legislation, and case law. Understanding
the evolution of relevant case law is critical to assessing whether U.S.
wetlands policy conforms to the Ramsar Convention's wise use requirement. The judiciary's evolving interpretation of wetlands legislation plays an important role in determining the scope of governmental authority in preserving wetland values.
A. Policy and Infrastructure
Thirty-six federal agencies conducted wetlands related activities
during fiscal years 1990-97. 35 Moreover, in constant 1997 dollars,
total funding for these activities increased from $508 million in fiscal
year 1990 to $787 million in fiscal year 1997.36 This represents approximately a fifty-five percent increase in funding. 37 The primary
federal agencies responsible for wetlands management and oversight
are the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("the Corps"), the Department
31

Id. at 9-10 (outlining the three steps of an effective public education program as: (1)

defining the audience; (2) research to identify the most appropriate educational approach for the
target audience; and (3)the actual education campaign).
32

Id. at9.

33 See NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICIES, supra note 20, at 14-15 (explaining that the

development
of a national wetlands policy is key to implementing the wise use concept).
34 Id. at 10-11.
35 See also GAO REPORT, supra note 4,at2.
36

id.

37

id.
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of Agriculture's Farm Service Agency and Natural Resources Conservation Service, the Department of Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service, the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"). 3 8 These six agencies represent seventy percent of
the funding and sixty-five percent of the personnel dedicated to wetlands management and programs.39
In 1989, President Bush announced a no net loss of wetlands policy, the first explicit national goal of U.S. wetlands policy. 4° In 1993,
President Clinton followed suit in seeking to protect the nation's wetlands by announcing five guiding principles to wetlands policy.
These five principles were:
1. A short-term goal of no net loss of wetlands followed by a
long-term goal of increasing both the quality and quantity of U.S.
wetlands;
2.
Create efficient, fair, flexible, and predictable wetlands
regulatory programs that minimize the impact on private property, but
also afford ample wetlands protection;
3.
Encourage the use of non-regulatory programs, advance
planning, restoration, inventory development and research, and public/private cooperation to accomplish long-term wetlands management goals;
4.
Expand federal cooperation with state, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, and individual citizens to protect wetlands; and
5.
Base federal wetlands policy on the best scientific information available.4 '
The Clinton Administration sought to achieve these five principles through several policy mechanisms including:

38

id.

39 Id.

40 1l at 3 (noting that even though several statutes protecting wetlands had been enacted,
and two executive orders established, prior to President Bush's no net loss policy the U.S. had
never had a specific and consistent wetlands policy).
"'

See PROTEMrING AMERICA'S WETLANDS, supranote 4, at 3.
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1. Promotion of wetlands restoration through voluntary, nonregulatory programs.
2. Encouragement of the use of advanced comprehensive
planning that includes wetlands identification, mapping, and assessment of wetlands functions in order to distinguish between wetlands
that are sensitive requiring significant protection and those that may
be used for development.
3.
Use of mitigation banks, which can be identified through
advanced planning.
4.
Emphasis on advanced planning at the local/watershed level
since there is no scientific basis for a nationwide ranking system for
wetlands types and functions.
5.

A greater role for state, local, and tribal governments. 42

The Clinton wetlands policy emphasized the important role for
mitigation banking43 as part of its national wetlands policy. Mitigation banking is defined as: "restoration, creation, enhancement, and in
exceptional circumstances, preservation undertaken expressly for the
purpose of compensating for unavoidable wetland losses in advance
of development actions, when such compensation cannot be achieved
at the development site or would not be as environmentally beneficial." 44 Thus, both the Bush and Clinton administrations took an active approach to conceptualizing and articulating a national wetlands
policy.
B. Legislation
A number of statutes govern federal wetlands management.
These statutes include the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
("Clean Water Act"), 45 the Water Resources Development Acts of

42

Id. at3-12.

43 Id. at 8 (asserting that Congress should endorse the use of mitigation banking as an

appropriate option, and provide statutory authority for states to use the Revolving Fund to capitalize mitigation banks since seventy-five percent of remaining wetlands in the lower forty-eight
states are on private property).
4
Department of Defense, Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of
Mitigation Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. 58,605, 58606 (Nov. 28, 1995) [hereinafter Department of Defense].
4 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
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1990, 46 1992,47 and 1996,48 and the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 ("NEPA"). 49 Of all of these statues, section 404 of the
Clean Water Act provides the primary means of managing wetlands
and regulating their use.50 Under section 404, the Secretary of the
Army, acting through the Corps, is authorized to issue permits for the
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters of the
United States.
Section 404(a)(1) authorizes the Corps to issue permits "for the
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters" after
notice and opportunity for public comment.5 ' Section 502(7) defines
navigable waters as any "navigable water of the United States,

' 52 and,

as discussed below, the judiciary's changing interpretation of this
term plays a large role in defiming federal authority to regulate wetlands. Section 404(b)(1) provides the substantive framework that the
Corps uses to determine if a permit is to be issued. Under section
404(b)(1), the Corps determines if a permit is to be granted based on
the Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites
for Dredged or Fill MaterialP3 promulgated by the EPA. In order to

protect wetlands, these Guidelines require the Corps to first determine
that there is no practicable alternative. As stated in the Guidelines:
"no discharge... shall be permitted if there is a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge which would have less adverse impact
on the aquatic ecosystem, so long as the alternative does not have
other significant adverse environmental consequences." 54

46

33 U.S.C. § 2317 (1994) (codifying the no net loss of wetlands policy announced by

the Bush Administration and requiring the Corps, EPA, and the Fish and Wildlife Service to
design a strategy for achieving this goal).
4' 33 U.S.C. § 2326 (1994) (authorizing the Corps to carry out wetlands protection, restoration, and creation projects).
4' 33 U.S.C. § 2330 (1994) (authorizing the Corps to conduct aquatic ecosystem projects
to enhance environmental quality).
49 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994) (requiring the preparation of environmental impact assessments for major federal actions including permitting of the dredging and filling of wetlands that
must address the environmental impacts and potential alternatives of the proposed action).
so See Jonathan Silverstein, Comment, Taking Wetlands to the Bank: The Role of Wetland MitigationBanking in a Comprehensive Approach to Wetlands Protection,22 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 129, 132 (1994) (describing section 404 as the primary means of U.S. wetlands
regulation). See also Matthew M. D'Amico, Be All that You Can Be, But Nothing More: National MiningAssociation v. United States Army Corp of Engineers and the Corps' CriticalLoss
of Wetlands Control, 17 PAcE ENvTL. L. REV. 325, 330 (2000) (explaining that section 404 is
the central source of federal authority to regulate wetlands because it gives the Corps the ability
to regulate the "discharge of dredge or fill material").
5'
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994).
52 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994).
53 40 C.F.R. pt. 230 (2000).
54 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2000).
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Practicable alternatives are presumed to exist for non-water dependent projects.55 A practicable alternative is an alternative that fulfills the basic project purpose, is available, and can be done taking
into account cost, technology and logistics. 56 The basic project purpose can have a significant impact on whether a practicable alternative may be found.57 Moreover, the Guidelines bar permits that will
result in the significant degradation of an aquatic resource.58
There are a number of safeguards that apply to the Corps'
evaluation of a permit which are delineated into internal and external
safeguards.5 9 According to the Corps, the most important internal
safeguard is the public interest review, which requires a "careful consideration of all public interest factors relevant to each particular
case." 6 The external safeguards include the EPA's statutory "veto"
power over the Corps' decision to issue a permit.6' Moreover, the
EPA, the Department of Commerce and Department of Interior may
request a high level review before a permit is issued if there is insufficient coordination at the Corps' district level, if important new information relevant to the project and permit application develops, or if
the project raises nationally significant issues.6 Finally, citizens may
sue the Corps to enjoin their decision to issue a permit.63
Beyond "practicable alternative" and these significant safeguards, the Corps applies a three-step sequence in evaluating a permit
application under section 404 of the Clean Water Act. These steps
are: (1) determining that potential adverse impacts have been avoided
55 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3) (2000). However, this is a rebuttable presumption. See
James City County v. EPA, 955 F.2d 254, 260 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding a lack of substantial
evidence for EPA's determination that there were practicable alternatives to the building of a
dam); Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 833 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming summary
judgment for Corps-approved golf-course, even if Corps limited its evaluation of practicable
alternatives and concluded none existed).
56 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.3(q) and 230.10(a)(2) (2000).
57 See Kim Diana Connolly, THE CORPS REGULATORY PROGRAM: SECTION
404 PERMITS AND SECTION 10 PERMITS 27 (February 6, 2001) (draft copy on file with author) (asserting
that the more narrowly a basic purpose is defined the less likely it is that a practicable alternative will be identified).
58 Id. at 26.
59 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, REGULATORY PROGRAM OVERVIEW 7, at

http://www.usace.army.millinetlfunctions/Cw/cecwolregloceover.htm

(last visited Nov. 21,

2001) [hereinafter REGULATORY PROGRAM OVERVIEW].
60 Id. See also Connolly, supra note 57, at 43 (listing the factors considered as part of
the pubic interest review as conservation, economics, general environmental issues, potential
flooding, soil protection and erosion, water quality and overall welfare of the public).
6'
33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1994). See also REGULATORY PROGRAM OVERVIEW, supra note
59, at 7 (describing the EPA's veto power as being the ability to prohibit a permit from being
issued if the EPA's Administrator believes the discharge of dredged or fill materials will have
an unacceptable impact on the relevant wetland(s)).
62
See REGULATORY PROGRAM OVERVIEW, supranote 59, at 7-8.
63
Id.at8.
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to the maximum extent practicable; (2) minimizing unavoidable impacts; and (3) providing compensatory mitigation for any remaining
adverse impacts.64 In fact, Section 404(b)(1) Guidelinesfor Specification of DisposalSites for Dredged or Fill Material requires "appropriate and practicable" compensatory mitigation. 65 Compensatory
mitigation includes the restoration of degraded wetlands or man made
creation of new ones. 66
Finally, public involvement, though not listed specifically as a
safeguard by the Corps, represents a significant safeguard in protecting wetlands. 67 First, at least for controversial projects, the Corps
uses public notice and public hearings to solicit comments from the
public in evaluating a project for which a permit application has been
submitted. Second, and perhaps more important, is public participation through the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") as required under NEPA6 for major federal actions. 69 In preparing an EIS, the federal agency must provide a detailed statement of
the potential environmental impacts of, along with alternatives to, a
proposed action.70 As the Corps describes the process, the public is
involved through almost every step of an EIS.7 '
C. Case Law
The judiciary's interpretation of wetlands management legislation is critical in defining the authority of the Corps and other federal
agencies to regulate wetlands. One issue that has been a source of
evolving legal doctrine is the courts' interpretation of the definition of
"navigable waters" under section 404(a)(1). As the case law demonstrates, the initial interpretation of "navigable waters" was expansive,
providing the Corps with broad regulatory authority. However, as the
definition has evolved and narrowed their regulatory authority has
diminished. The same pattern has emerged regarding discharges that
the Corps may regulate.
6
See Memorandum of Agreement between the Environmental Protection Agency and
the Department of the Army Concerning the Determination of Mitigation under the Clean Water
Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210 (1990) [hereinafter MOA].
6
40 C.F.R. § 230.10(d) (2000).
6
See MOA, supra note 64, at 9212.

67

See REGULATORY PROGRAM OVERVIEW, supranote 59, at 4-5.

42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(c) (1994).
See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b) (2000) (describing approval of project permits as a major
federal action requiring the preparation of an EIS).
70 id.
71 See REGULATORY PROGRAM OVERVIEW, supra note 59, at 4-5 (outlining the public's
69

involvement in an EIS as actual face to face input during the seoping process, and providing
comments on the draft EIS that includes comments not only on the EIS, but on the proposed
project itself).
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Generally, wetlands are not lakes, rivers, and streams or that
which we normally conceptualize as navigable waters. Earlier in the
history of the Clean Water Act, the judiciary had a broad interpretation of navigable waters, thereby expanding the federal government's
authority to regulate the exploitation, degradation and destruction of
wetlands. In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,72 the Court
addressed this issue. The Corps sought to prohibit Riverside Bayview, without a permit, from filling in wetlands "near," and thus adjacent to a lake, in preparation for a housing development. The Corps
asserted its jurisdiction under the regulation that defined wetlands as:
"areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a
frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal
circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically
adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas. 7 3
The Court approved the Corps' interpretation of the statute. In so
doing, the Court found that the actual statutory language, legislative
history, and underlying policies of the Clean Water Act justified such
an interpretation. 74 Specifically, the Court found that the broad definition navigable waters contained in section 502(7), "waters of the
United States," demonstrated that Congress intended to include its
Commerce Clause authority to regulate "at least some waters that
would not be deemed 'navigable' under the classical understanding of
that term." 75 However, the Court specifically noted that its decision
in Riverside Bayview did not address wetlands that were not necessarily adjacent to navigable waters, 776an issue that the Court has recently
addressed in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers.77
Indeed, the Solid Waste Court made specific note of the Court's
reservation in Riverside Bayview. 78 In contrast to the wetlands in Riverside Bayview, the wetlands in Solid Waste were not adjacent to
navigable waters. In Solid Waste, the Court held that section 404
474 U.S. 121 (1985).
Id. at 123-24 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (c) (1978)).
Id. at 131-39. See also Natural Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp 685, 686
(D.D.C. 1975) (holding that by defining navigable waters within the Clean Water Act as "waters
of the United States," Congress demonstrated its intent to assert federal authority "over the
nation's waters to the maximum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution").
75 See Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133.
76 See id. at 124 n.2 & 131-32 n.8 (noting that the Corps' regulations covering
wetlands
not adjacent
to other waters were not an issue in the case).
7
7 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
78 See id. at 167 (explaining that the holding in Riverside Bayview was due
to the "significant nexus between the wetlands and the 'navigable waters').
72

73
74
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powers to regulate the discharge of dredged or fill material do not
extend to isolated intrastate wetlands. 79 The Court's decision was
based on its finding that Congress did not intend that the definition of
navigable waters apply to such wetlands. 80 However, the Court did
suggest that if it were to address the constitutional issue, it would find
that the regulation of isolated intrastate wetlands exceeded the limits
of power conferred under the Commerce Clause.81
The courts' definition of what constitutes a discharge for purposes of section 404 of the Clean Water Act demonstrates a similar
pattern of shrinking federal regulatory authority over wetlands. In
Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh82 the court held that discharge included re-deposits of materials that had been removed from
wetlands.8 3 The landowners in Avoyelles used large mechanized
equipment, including bulldozers and tractors, to clear trees and other
vegetation that resulted in the re-deposit of some of the materials as
part of the clearing process. 84 Likewise, in Rybachek v. EPA85 the
court ruled that re-depositing waste materials back into a waterway
after separating out the desired materials is also a discharge that the
federal government may regulate. 86 In Rybacheck, the re-deposited
material was found to have adverse impacts on aesthetics and waterquality since the material was composed of toxic metals. 87 However,88
in National Mining Association v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that de minimis falback as part of normal dredging operations does not constitute
a discharge subject to section 404 regulation. 89 The court distin79
Id. See also U.S. ENViRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS GENERAL COUNSEL MEMORANDUM ON SUPREME COURT RULING CONCERNING
2001), available at
CWA JURISDICTION OVER ISOLATED WATERS (Jan. 19,

http:l/www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands (explaining that the Court's holding effectively prohibits
imposing regulations under the Clean Water Act on "intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including
intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows,

playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation, or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce"5.

"o See Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 167-68 (stating that neither the language of the Clean
Water Act, nor legislative history demonstrated sufficient Congressional intent to extend section
404 authority to isolated intrastate wetlands).
81 See id. at 172-74 (asserting that there are significant constitutional questions raised
regarding the validity of imposing federal regulations on the wetlands at issue). See also United
States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251,257-58 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Corps may not regulate
intrastate wetlands that could affect interstate commerce under the Clean Water Act).
715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
s2
" See id. at 923.
See id. at 920-23.
8
85 904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990).
86 See id.at 1285-86.
87 See i. at 1282.
88 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
'9 See id. at 1404.
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guished the incidental fallback in National Mining from the largescale re-deposits in Avoyelles. 90 By limiting the Corps' authority, this
decision could become a considerable impediment to wetlands protection and management. 91
III. COMPENSATORY MITIGATION: THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF
MITIGATION BANKS AND IN-LIEu-FEEs
Compensatory mitigation represents a sound alternative when
wetland impacts are unavoidable and is the most recent dynamic interaction between federal government policy and its statutory authority under section 404. The role of compensatory mitigation continues
to grow as government regulatory authorities and developers attempt
to strike a balance between further growth and preservation of wetlands values and functions. Therefore, compensatory mitigation, at
least conceptually, is fully consistent with wise use under the Ramsar
Convention that also seeks to balance the competing needs of development and sustainability. Currently, the Wise Use Guidance implicitly recognizes the possible role of compensatory
mitigation, and it
92
should explicitly due so in the future.
In 1990, the Corps and the EPA entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement ("MOA") clarifying the sequencing scheme of avoiding
wetlands impacts, mitigating those that must occur, and then requiring
compensatory mitigation for those that are unavoidable. 93 Specifically, when unavoidable wetlands impacts occur, compensatory mitigation should be required based on the following criteria:
1.
On-site compensatory mitigation is preferred over off-site
mitigation;
2.
If off-site compensatory mitigation is not practical, the
mitigation should take place within the geographic region/watershed;
3.
In-kind (i.e. wetlands of the same type) compensatory mitigation is preferred over out-of-kind mitigation; and

90

Id. at 1406. See also D'Amico, supra note 50, at 346 (noting this distinction between

NationalMining and Avoyelles).
91 See D'Amico, supra note 50, at 327 (describing NationalMining as a potentially significant limitation on the ability to protect wetlands through stricter regulation).
92 See also WISE USE GUIDELINES, supra note 19, at 3 (listing restoration of wetlands at
particular sites that have been degraded as means to address wetlands problems at specific sites).
93 See Silverstein, supra note 50, at 132 (explaining that the purpose of the MOA was to
clarify the Corps' process in issuing section 404 permits).

20011

U.S. WETLANDS AND THE RAMSAR CONVENTION

4.
Wetlands restoration is preferred over man-made wetlands
due to a greater likelihood of success. 94
Given that the objective of compensatory mitigation is to counteract environmental losses, the MOA provides significant flexibility
to the Corps in establishing the minimum mitigation requirement for
wetlands that are adversely affected due to issuance of a section 404
permit. The default ratio is 1:1. However, the Corps states "where
functional values of the area being impacted are demonstrably high
and the replacement wetlands are of lower functional value or the
likelihood of success of the mitigation project is low" the mitigation
requirement may be higher. 95 Two means of providing compensatory
mitigation that have received increasing attention are mitigation
banks and in-lieu-fee arrangements.
Consistent with the Clinton Administration policy discussed earlier, the MOA also recognized that mitigation banking might be an
appropriate means of compensatory mitigation. 6 However, the MOA
provided little specific guidance on mitigation banking. In 1995, the
Corps, the EPA, and the Departments of Agriculture, Interior and
Commerce issued the Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use
and Operationof Mitigation Banks.97 In fact, in what seems to represent a change in policy since the MOA in 1990, the mitigation bank
guidance "relies on the use of compensatory mitigation to offset unavoidable damage to wetlands. 98 Mitigation banking is defined as
the "restoration, creation, enhancement and, in exceptional circumstances, preservation of wetlands and/or other aquatic resources exmitigation in adpressly for the purpose of providing compensatory
99
resources."
similar
to
impacts
authorized
of
vance
The goal of mitigation banking is to provide cost-effective and
flexible means of maintaining the ecological functions of a watershed. 1°° To facilitate their success, the guidance suggests the mitigation banks should be considered not in isolation, but as part of an
overall watershed plan, and the techniques employed should be carefully chosen based on those that have yielded the highest long-term
success rate. 0 1 To establish a mitigation bank, sponsors must submit
a prospectus that is used to develop a mitigation bank instrument that
See MOA, supra note 64, at 9212.
See id.
See id.
See Department of Defense, supra note 44, at 58,605.
98 See kL at 58,606.
99 See i&at 58,607.
'0o See id. at 58,608-58,609.
101 Id.
94
95
96
97
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documents the objectives and administration including ecological and
financial resources.1°2 Documenting sound financial resources is
critical to assuring long-term management and monitoring of the
banks, and the mitigation bank guidance places the responsibility for
assuring the successful operation of the bank squarely on the bank's
sponsor, and specifically requires that the wetlands be protected in
perpetuity.10 3 Currently, there are approximately 100 mitigation
banks throughout the U.S. across thirty-four states.
Moreover, substantial evidence suggests that the role of mitigation banking can be
expected to grow in the future.105
Interestingly, the mitigation bank guidance promulgated in 1995
defined mitigation banks not to include in-lieu-fee/fee mitigation arrangements and provided only minimal formal direction as to when
such an approach might be used.1°6 In-lieu-fee mitigation requires
funds to be paid to a prescribed entity or organization that will use the
funds to carry out wetlands mitigation efforts or purchase credits from
an existing mitigation bank. In fact, such compensatory mitigation
programs have been implemented in several states across the U.S.1°7
The Corps, EPA, and the Departments of Interior and Commerce
have issued the Federal Guidance on the Use of In-Lieu-Fee Arrangements for Compensatory Mitigation Under Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act and Section 10 of the Rivers and HarborsAct.' °8
Under the In-Lieu-Fee guidance, where appropriate, an in-lieu-fee
arrangement may be used to provide compensatory mitigation by establishing an agreement "between the sponsor and the agencies" that

'02
See id. at 58,609 (listing the information contained in a mitigation bank instrument as:
(a) bank goals and objectives; (b) ownership of bank lands; (c) bank size and type of wetlands
and other water-based resources to be included in the bank site; (d) baseline conditions of the
site; (e) geographic service area; (f) types of impacted wetlands for which the mitigation bank
may properly provide compensatory mitigation; (g) methods of determining debits and credits;
(h) accounting procedures; (i) performance standards; (j) reporting procedures; (k) contingency
and remedial plans; (1) financial assurances; (m) compensation ratios; and (n) provisions for
long-term management and maintenance).
,03 See id. at 58,612.
104

See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. EPA-240-R-01-001,

THE

UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 107 (2001) [hereinafter EPA].

105 See id. (asserting that wetlands mitigation banking, due to its endorsement by the
Corps, EPA, and by legislators behind the reauthorization of the Clean Water Act, will grow in
importance as a means of protecting the nation's wetlands).

106 See id. at 18.
107 See id. at 54 (noting that Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi,

Texas, and Virginia have used in-lieu-fee compensation programs).

108 DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FEDERAL GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF IN-LIEU-FEE ARRANGE-

MENTS FOR COMPENSATORY MITIGATION UNDER SECTION 404 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND

SECTION 10 OF THE RIVERS HARBORS ACT 3 (2001) [hereinafter FEDERAL GUIDANCE], available at http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/iwr/Regulatory/regulintro.htm.
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contains the same information as the instrument needed for the establishment of a mitigation bank.1 09
In-lieu-fee agreements may be used to compensate for lost wetlands for individual site permits as well as general permits. 1 0 For
general permits, in-lieu-fees may be used for fulfilling compensatory
mitigation requirements when on-site mitigation is not possible or less
environmentally beneficial. Further, the In-Lieu-Fee guidance sets
forth several factors to consider in planning and establishing an inlieu-fee compensatory mitigation arrangement."'
An example of a well-designed in-lieu-fee compensatory mitigation program is the Lake Belt Mitigation Plan ("LBMP"). In 1992 the
Florida Legislature created the Lake Belt Committee to design a plan
that "maximizes efficient recovery of limestone while promoting the
social and economic welfare of the community and protecting the environment."11 2 In developing the approximately fifty-year LBMP,
federal, state and local government officials developed a detailed
master plan in concert with the Florida rock mining industry. The
LBMP allows the rock mining industry to recover hundreds of thousands of tons of lime rock that lies beneath wetlands in exchange for
an in-lieu-fee to be used to achieve compensatory mitigation through
government acquisition, enhancement and maintenance of wetlands.
The required compensatory mitigation ratio has been determined to be
2.5:1 per acre of wetlands.113 Key components of the in-lieu-fee program include the implementation of:
1. a fee per ton on all limestone sold from the Lake Belt area,
including an established formula for the annual adjustment to account
for cost growth in carrying out mitigation activities.
109 See id.
n0 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (1994) (stating the Secretary of the Army may issue general
permits, five years in length, on a state, regional, or nationwide basis for a category of activities
for the discharge of dredged or fill materials into wetlands).
n1 See FEDERAL GUIDANCE, supra note 108, at 4-7 (describing relevant planning factors
to include: (1) ensuring the sponsor is a qualified organization; (2) advanced planning in cooperation with the Corps; (3) watershed-based planning; (4) careflul site selection; (5) assurance of
technical feasibility; (6) determining an appropriate role for wetlands preservation; (7) ensuring
that funds are used for wetlands mitigation projects only; and (8) assurance of sufficient funding
for the perpetual monitoring and management of compensatory mitigation sites).
112 See SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, MIAMI-DADE COUNTY LAKE

BELT PLAN IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE 1999 PROGRESS REPORT 2 (2000) [hereinafter MIAMI-DADE REPORT].
113 See SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, MIAMI-DADE COUNTY LAKE
BELT PLAN PURPOSE AND SUMMARY OF MITIGATION SUBCOMMITEE (2001) (asserting that the
mitigation ratio was determined after careful study of the area by the Corps, State Department of
Environmental Protection, SFWMD, Miami-Dade County Department of Environmental Re-

EPA),
the
and
Management
and
sources
/www.sfwmd.gov/org/pld/proj/lakebelt/subcommitteef2.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2001).

at

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:627

2.
a report recommending any changes in the fee to ensure that
revenue from the fee covers the actual cost of mitigation activities,
beginning January 31, 2010.114
In exchange for paying the fee, the limestone mining industry receives a streamlined regulatory permitting process, and greater business operating certainty. 1 5 Notwithstanding the issuance of the InLieu-Fee guidance, and well-designed projects such as the Lake Belt
Mitigation Plan, there remains a preference
for mitigation banks to be
16
the source of compensatory mitigation.1
IV. CONSISTENCY OF U.S. NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICY,
LEGISLATION, AND CASE LAW WITH THE WISE USE CONCEPT OF THE
RAMSAR CONVENTION

Analysis of U.S. national wetlands policy, legislation and case
law demonstrates consistency with the Guidelines for the Implementation of the Wise Use concept of the Ramsar Convention. U.S. policy, legislation, and case law have created the institutional arrangements, statutory framework, and system for assessing projects on a
site-by-site basis that the Wise Use Guidance suggests is essential to
the successful implementation of the wise use concept. Section 404
of the Clean Water Act complies with the recommendation that a
permitting system be established for actions that affect wetlands. The
NEPA requirement that an EIS be prepared for major federal actions
such as issuing permits is consistent with the Wise Use Guidance's
specification that well designed wetlands management plans include
such an assessment to determine the impact of projects on wetlands.
In the context of a specific wetlands site, the permitting and EIS processes of section 404 of the Clean Water Act and NEPA are fully consistent with the wise use concept. As discussed in Part II, the Ramsar's Wise Use Guidance recognizes that there are competing uses for
wetlands, which if done in a sustainable manner, can be consistent
with wise use. Together, section 404 of the Clean Water Act and
NEPA theoretically satisfy the sustainable use of wetlands resources.
It is important to note that in addition to the Clean Water Act and
NEPA, there are several other statutes that relate to protecting or con,14

See MIAMI-DADE REPORT,

supra note 112, at 3.
See id. at 4.
116 See FEDERAL GUIDANCE, supra note 108, at 4 (explaining that
in-lieu-fees are preferred over mitigation banks when the bank cannot provide in-kind mitigation, or when the only
available bank credits are for preservation rather than wetlands restoration, enhancement or
creation).

'"
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serving wetlands in the U.S. 1 17 For example, under section 7(a)(2) of
Endangered Species Act, the Corps must consult with the Fish and
Wildlife Service to ensure that if a wetlands permit is issued it will
not jeopardize endangered or threatened species or their wetlands
habitat. 118 A second example is the Swampbuster program contained
in the Food Security Act." 9 Under this program, farmers who plant
crops on converted wetlands are not eligible for U.S. Department of
Agriculture ("USDA") farm program benefits including several forms
of loans and other assistance. Section 106 of the National Historic
Preservation Act' 2° requires federal agencies to account for the impact
of their undertakings on historic resources, which may include wetlands permits, and provide a justification for proceeding with the undertaking. Finally, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Act, 121 as amended
by the Sustainable Fisheries Act, now includes provisions that provide an additional safeguard on destruction of wetlands that are essential fish habitats.'
Moreover, cases such as United States v. Riverside Bayview,123
Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. March,124 and Rybachek v. EPA125
have allowed the Corps to extend its wetlands regulatory program to
what seems to be the greatest extent possible under the Clean Water
Act. In addition, as described above, the U.S. has dedicated substantial financial resources and personnel for wetlands protection. Further, the U.S. has developed extensive inventories, a critical compoour
nent to enhancing our knowledge of wetlands, and has monitored
26
success in preserving wetlands and their ecological functions.'

117

See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 3. The GAO Report explains that there are over

twenty-five federal statutes that have resulted in:
1. regulation of activities undertaken in areas designated as wetlands;
2.
acquisition of wetlands through purchase or protective easements that prevent
certain activities, such as draining and filling;
restoration of damaged wetlands or the creation of new wetlands; and
3.
4.
disincentives to altering wetlands or incentives to protect them in their natural
states. Id
18 16 U.S.C § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
.. 16 U.S.C §§ 3811- 3812 (1994).
,20 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1994).
121 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (1994).
12
See Kristen M. Fletcher & Sharonne E. O'Shea, Essential Fish Habitat:Does Calling
It EssentialMake It So?, 30 ENVTL L. 51, 92-97 (2000) (explaining that the "essential fish habitat" language requires federal agencies to consider and consult with the Secretary of Commerce
regarding the impact of their actions on essential habitats).
23 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
124 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
'25 904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990).
126 Id at 5 (describing the National Wetlands Inventory maintained by the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Resources Inventory managed by the National Resources Conservation Service).
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Avoiding and minimizing adverse impacts on wetlands from human activity is clearly consistent with the wise use mandate of Ramsar. Moreover, compensatory mitigation, including mitigation banks
and in-lieu-fee arrangements, can play a significant role. Mitigation
banks and in-lieu-fees represent the use of market incentives for protecting the environment because they are designed to allow development while preserving the ecological and environmental functions of
wetlands. 2 7 The positive aspects of mitigation banks include:
1. Environmental values are better protected in large-scale
mitigation efforts;
2.
Large-scale mitigation efforts take advantage of economies
of scale that improves the long-run ability for compensatory mitigation efforts to succeed; and
3.
vance.

Developers will know the cost of wetland mitigation in ad-

Another important factor that favors mitigation banking is the
ability to provide compensatory mitigation in advance of adverse impacts on wetlands.12 9 Finally, large-scale mitigation efforts allow for
more effective government enforcement and monitoring of compensatory mitigation projects. 130 In-lieu-fee programs can provide many of
the same advantages so long as the fees are channeled to large mitigation projects. The one advantage that mitigation banks may have over
in-lieu-fee arrangements is that the former provides advanced mitigation whereas the latter probably will not.
Notwithstanding apparent compliance, there are several shortcomings and limits to U.S. ability to meet the wise use mandate of the
127 See Donald A. Carr & William L. Thomas, Looking for a Way To Reduce Wetland
PermittingDelays and Costs? Put Your Money in a Bank, METROPOLITAN CoRP. COUNS., Apr.
1998, at 8 (describing mitigation banks as a means of compensatory mitigation designed to
offset wetland losses from development that has gained growing acceptance, and actually increases incentives for private owners of wetlands not to develop their property).
,28 See EPA, supra note 104, at 107. See also Silverstein, supra note 50, at 137-39 (outlining the benefits of mitigation banking to include advanced mitigation, consolidated largescale mitigation projects, and streamlining the permitting process by avoiding having to negotiate several small individual mitigation projects); Department of Defense, supra note 44, 60 Fed.
Reg., at 58,607 (describing the advantages of mitigation banks over individual mitigation projects as a better ability to maintain the quality of the ecosystem, aggregation of financial and
scientific resources and expertise, and an improved permitting process).
129 See Le Desma, supra note 1, at 503 (outlining EPA and developers' position that using
mitigation banks reduces the temporal loss of wetlands).
,30 See Silverstein, supranote 50, at 137. See also Department of Defense, supra note 44,
at 58,607.
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Ramsar Convention. First, the quality and accuracy of both U.S. inventories is highly questionable. According to the General Accounting Office, "officials from the Environmental Protection Agency have
expressed concern about the estimates of both inventories. The issues
raised by officials of the two inventories and EPA include the adequacy of quality control of data and of quality assurance procedures,
the dates of aerial
photography used, and the methods used to develop
3
the estimates."' '
In addition to the inventory problems identified above, the reliability of the data is questionable because of the use of inconsistent
definitions by the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Resources
Conservation Service, the inclusion of non-wetlands acreage data, and
double counting. Data shortcomings make it difficult to assess accomplishments in protecting wetlands. Moreover, they make wetlands conservation and protection efforts extremely hard to plan.
These effects of poor data are inconsistent with the wise use concept.
Second, as noted earlier, both NationalMining and Solid Waste
have curbed the authority of the federal government to protect the
quality of wetlands. Significant environmental harms and loss of wetlands could result. As D'Amico states:
Among the harms that could result from the D.C. Circuit's
ruling [in NationalMining] are: loss of the bottomland hardwood wetlands of the Southeast, which would destroy fish
and wildlife habitats while reducing water quality and increasing flooding; wetlands losses in the prairie potholes of
the upper Midwest, which would threaten waterfowl habitats
and also increase flooding while reducing water quality;
scraping and scouring of riparian areas throughout the West,
destroying the
anadramous fish habitat and downstream wa32
ter quality. 1
As a direct reaction to Solid Waste, a shopping center development company asserted that it could proceed, without a permit, to fill
in 12.3 acres of intrastate isolated wetlands at a site in Bainbridge
Township, Ohio. Though the developer offered to provide compensatory mitigation, in light of Solid Waste, the developer has emphasized
its ability to fill in the wetlands without a permit or providing mitiga-

131 See also GAO REPORT, supranote 4, at 6.
132 D'Amico, supra note 50, at 350.
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tion. 3' At that time, Ohio did not have its own state-permitting
scheme, the state had no regulatory authority independent of that provided by federal regulatory law. 134 In fact, many states do not have
their own independent permitting program.
Finally, though mitigation banking and in-lieu-fee arrangements
represent an innovative means to fulfill our national policy of "no net
loss" of wetlands and also fulfills the U.S. international wise use obligation, there are several concerns with their effectiveness. 135 Compensatory mitigation may be ineffective "because the science of creat1 36
ing, enhancing, and restoring wetlands is imprecise and unproved.
Previous efforts have yielded unsatisfactory success rates.1 37 Given
the apparent growth in reliance on compensatory mitigation through
banking and in-lieu-fees, failure to achieve constant high success
rates would result in a loss of both wetlands and wetland functions.
Neither outcome is consistent with the wise use obligations under the
Ramsar Convention. Thus, further research and careful planning
must be undertaken to ensure success in the future.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENHANCE U.S. COMPLIANCE W1TH THE
RAMSAR CONVENTION'S WISE USE OBLIGATION

The U.S. must take several steps to enhance its compliance with
its obligations as a signatory to the Ramsar Convention. First, the
U.S. must improve the quality of its national wetlands data and develop a single set of data. Only with clear and consistent data can the
U.S. properly assess the state of wetlands and implement appropriate
programs for their protection. The Clinton administration made significant efforts to develop accurate data and in May 1998, the Federal
Interagency Wetlands Working Group issued an action plan to produce a single wetlands status and trends report. 138 To date this has not
been accomplished. However, in developing a plan to address this
data deficiency, budgetary constraints might properly exclude or defer
wetlands not subject to imminent development.
133

See Karen Farkas, Developers Propose Wetlands Deal, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Feb.

13, 2001, atB3.
134
135

id.

See EPA, supra note 104, at 119 (describing another innovative program, the Conser-

vation Resource Program, that pays farmers to place wetlands in the Conservation Reserve
rather than draining and cultivating them).
136
Silverstein, supra note 50, at 133. See also Le Desma, supra note 1, at 502 (explaining that the "functional value [of wetlands] cannot be easily quantified").
137
See Silverstein, supra note 50, at 133 (citing a 1985 study of mitigation projects in
Virginia in which only nine of thirty-two compensatory mitigation sites were found to be fully
successful). See also Le Desma, supra note 1, at 518 (citing a 1990 Florida Department of
Environmental Resources study that less than forty percent of completed compensatory mitigation projects are successful).
13 See GAO REPORT, supranote 4, at 8.
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Congress must amend the Clean Water Act to provide federal
regulatory authority over de minimis or incidental fall back. The National Mining court's decision turned on its interpretation of Congress's intent. 139 In fact, the regulation to strengthen wetlands protection EPA and Corps promulgated that went into effect on April 17,
2001 excludes incidental fall back as required under National Mining.14° To address this regulatory loophole, Congress can simply
make it clear that its intent is to allow the Corps to regulate de minimis or incidental fallback, especially given the otherwise potential
adverse impacts on wetlands.
The dilemma Solid Waste has created is more difficult to solve.
Though Solid Waste was decided based on statutory interpretation,
the Court strongly suggested that had it decided the case based on
constitutional grounds; federal attempts to regulate isolated intrastate
wetlands would be a violation of the Commerce Clause. To address
this issue, Congress should establish a clear link between isolated intrastate wetlands and interstate commerce. Given the court's language in Solid Waste, it may be difficult to establish a link that will
withstand judicial scrutiny. This leaves Congress with few alternatives. Congress cannot mandate that states implement regulatory programs to fill the void in federal authority. In New York v. United
States,'4' the Court held that the federal government violated the
Tenth Amendment in its attempt to coerce state legislatures into its
service or to force states to assume federal responsibilities. Specifically, the Court found that New York's requirement that either "take
title" to low-level radioactive waste or regulate the waste according to
instructions contained in Congressional legislation was unconstitutional.' 42
However, Congress can provide funding to encourage states to
regulate wetlands, including isolated intrastate wetlands, and enhance
their wetlands management capabilities without violating the Tenth
Amendment. 143 The EPA has an existing funding program, the Wetland Development Grants Program, through which Congress can
139 See D'Amico, supra note 50, at 350 (asserting that, given the current language of the
Clean Water Act, the decision in NationalMining was correct).
140 See Press Release, Environmental Protection Agency, Press Release on the Final "Tulloch Rule" Clarification: Enhanced Wetlands Protection (2001), available at
http:/www.epa.gov/owowlwetlands.
141 505 U.S. 144 (1992). See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (ruling
that the federal government cannot commandeer state executive officers into the federal government's service).
142 See New York, 505 U.S. at 173-74.
143 1& (asserting that using monetary incentives to entice states to regulate low level radioactive waste according to federal desires does not violate state sovereignty under the Tenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
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act.144 Further, at least some of the states have no regulations permitting systems for isolated intrastate wetlands due to a lack of statutory
authority. The Association of State Wetland Managers, Inc. has
drafted a Model State Wetland Protection Act to help states address
this void.145
Alternatively, Congress may exercise its combined power under
Article II, Section 2; Article VI, Section 2; and Article I, Section 8 of
the Constitution to require the states to implement regulatory programs to protect isolated intrastate wetlands. This power is not constrained by the Tenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause. 146 The
ability to enact environmental legislation without relying on the
Commerce Clause may be particularly important given the Court's
decisions in United States v. Lopez1 47 and United States v. Morrison.1 48 As one commentator has stated:
The Lopez decision signaled a potentially dramatic shift in
the Supreme Court's judicial review of congressional action
under the Commerce Clause ...This recent flurry of Commerce Clause challenges, and the success of several of these
challenges in the lower courts, mark a departure from the
previous sixty years of Commerce Clause jurisprudence and
suggest that older statutes such as the [Endangered Species
Act] ...may be vulnerable to a similar attack... Given that
the fundamental purpose of the ESA is to protect endangered
144 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, WETLAND PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

GRANTS (explaining that the purpose of the program was to provide state, tribal and local governments with fund in order to implement and maintain wetlands management programs), at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands2002grant (last updated Nov. 11, 2001).
145 See MODEL STATE WETLAND STATUTE (Ass'n of State Wetland Managers, Draft
2001) (explaining that the association's model statute is designed "to help states close the gap in
regulations for isolated wetlands created by the U.S. Supreme Court SWANCC decision"), available at http:/lwww.aswm.orglpolicylmodel-leg.pdf (June 6, 2001).
146 See Matthew Schaefer, Sovereignty Revisited: The "Grey Areas" and "Yellow Zones"
of Split Sovereignty Exposed by Globalization:Choosing Among Strategies of Avoidance, Cooperation, andIntrusion to Escape an Era of Misguided "New Federalism," 24 CAN.-U.S. L. J.
35, 48 (1998) (explaining that legislation that might otherwise violate of the Tenth Amendment
is constitutional if passed in order to fulfill an obligation under a formally adopted international
treaty). See also Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism,97 MICH. L.
REV. 390, 392-95 (1998) (noting that conventional wisdom is that the treaty power of the federal government is not limited by either subject matter or the Tenth Amendment); Gavin R.
Villareal, One Leg to Stand On: The Treaty Power and CongressionalAuthorityfor the EndangeredSpecies Act after United States v. Lopez, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1125, 1153-55 (1998) (explaining that the treaty power is specifically delegated to the federal government, and is independent
of the Commerce Clause and not limited by the Tenth Amendment).
147 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Congress lacked the authority to enact the Gun-Free
School Zones Act under the Commerce Clause because gun possession is unrelated to economic
or commercial activity under the Commerce Clause).
148 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate gender-motivated violent crimes since such crimes were unrelated to
economic activity).
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species and not to regulate commercial activity, the Act
seems ripe for a challenge as extending beyond the bounds of
congressional authority. 49
Under Article II, Section 2, the power to make treaties is expressly delegated to the federal government. Moreover, Article VI,
Section 2 states 'This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land."'15 Article I, Section 8 is the necessary and proper clause and provides Congress with the authority to
pass implementing legislation. In Missouri v. Holland,15 1 the Court
held that the Tenth Amendment prohibitions on federal interference
with state sovereignty do not constrain federal authority to implement
international treaties such as the Ramsar Convention. As Justice
Holmes stated:
To answer this question it is not enough to refer to the
Tenth Amendment, reserving the powers not delegated to the
United States, because by Article II, § 2, the power to make
treaties is delegated expressly, and by Article VI treaties
made under the authority of the United States, along with the
Constitution and laws of the United States made in pursuance
thereof, are declared the supreme law of the land. If the
treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the
statute under Article I, § 8, as a necessar and proper means
to execute the powers of the Government.
In Missouri, the Court asserted that since Congress has the authority to ratify international treaties, legislation enacted to implement
the treaty is binding on the states. 153 This argument has also been applied to the Endangered Species Act, 154 and has been or might be applicable to several other substantive legal areas.155 Notwithstanding
conventional wisdom and the fact that Missouri remains good law, it
is important to note that some commentators question the immunity
149

See Villareal, supra note 146, 1138-1141.

1SO U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
'i
152

252 U.S. 416 (1920).
Id. at432.

"'

M at433-35.

154 See Villareal, supra note 146, at 1153-60 (asserting that the Western Convention, a

treaty addressing the international protection of endangered species, provides Congress with
legal authority to enact the Endangered Species Act independent of the Commerce Clause).
155 See Bradley, supra note 146, at 401-09 (suggesting that the treaty power might be used
to overcome federalism constraints such as those the Commerce Clause imposes not only for
environmental statutes, but also for legislation related to religious freedom, human rights, criminal law and punishment, commerce and trade, and commandeering of state governments).
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of the treaty power from federalism limitations imposed on other federal powers such as the Commerce Clause. 156 For example, Bradley
asserts that the justifications for not subjecting the treaty power to
traditional federalism concerns, are, if not invalid, highly questionable. Moreover, he argues that Missouri is inconsistent with the re57
newed emphasis on protecting states rights in Lopez and Morrison.
Finally, the federal government must continue to fund research to
improve our scientific understanding of wetlands functions and the
natural processes that affect them. Through this enhanced understanding, the U.S. can improve its ability to successfully employ
compensatory mitigation, particularly through innovate approaches
such as mitigation banks and in-lieu-fee arrangements. 158 In an expanding nation such as the U.S., we must compensate for the adverse
impacts to our wetlands in order to maintain the quality of our environment and fulfill our international obligations.
CONCLUSION

U.S. wetlands management demonstrates substantial compliance
with its wise use obligations under the Ramsar Convention. Still,
some significant obstacles remain. The ability of the federal government is limited by recent judicial decisions, the need for improved
data and planning, and an improved technical understanding of wetland functions. Nevertheless, the U.S. wetlands management provides
a model for other countries, particularly developing countries, to follow, in designing a national wetlands policy and the associated technical expertise. The Wise Use Guidance has cited both of these items
as critical components.
As the U.S. experience demonstrates, the effort to manage wetlands appropriately is financially resource intensive and requires a
substantial number of trained experts. There are potential sources of
funding such as the Global Environment Facility administered by the
United Nations Development Program, which provides grants to help
developing nations protect the environment. Thus, nations that follow
156

See id. at 434-50 (describing the justifications underlying Missouri, or what he terms

the "nationalist view," as the Constitution's specific delegation to the federal government of the
ability to protect state's rights and the need to speak with one-voice with regard to foreign affairs).
157 See id. at 450-51 (arguing that the reasons for protecting federalism are as equally
applicable to the treaty powers as to other powers of the federal government).
158 See Le Demsa, supra note 1, at 517-18 (asserting that we must improve our scientific
and technical ability to build artificial wetlands). See also Silverstein, supra note 50, at 147-61
(discussing several factors that enhance the success rate of mitigation banks including advanced
planning and locating banks within the same watershed as impacted wetlands).
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the U.S. model may need to seek outside funding, especially developing nations.
A wholesale adoption of U.S. wetlands management policies may
not be appropriate, for example, in a nation that lacks a strong central
government, a tradition of an administrative state, or a system of
property rights similar to that of the U.S. 159 There is strong evidence
that political and administrative frameworks, along with cultural factors influence the design of health and environmental policies across
developed countries. 16° Plainly, if differences in political, administrative and cultural customs demonstrate that a uniform regulatory approach cannot be applied across developed countries, a blanket transfer of U.S. wetlands policy to developing nations is unlikely to be
successful.
Finally, the Ramsar Convention should explicitly incorporate
compensatory mitigation, including mitigation banking and in-lieufee arrangements, into the Wise Use Guidance. Though there are
questions about its effectiveness, compensatory mitigation, especially
mitigation banking and in-lieu-fee arrangements, are finding increased use in the U.S. as a means of balancing the needs of economic
growth with those of preserving important wetlands function and values. While balancing the needs of economic growth and wetlands
preservation is important in the U.S., this may be especially important
in developing nations.
MICHAEL J. PODOLSKY t

"9 See Christine N. Dodd, Wetlands Protection Law: A Comparative Analysis of the
FederalLaws of the United States and Canada,and the Local Laws of Michigan and Ontario,8
MSU-DCL J. INT'L L. 793, 817 (1999) (explaining that even Canada, a developed nation, could
improve its wetlands preservation efforts by creating a more comprehensive centralized legislative framework such as the U.S.'s).
160 See SHEILA JASANOFF, RISK MANAGEMENT AND POLITICAL CULTURE 5 (1985) (ex-

plaining that differences in national attitudes, which are a function of political, administrative,
and cultural traditions, explain the different role of science in developing regulatory schemes for
cancer causing chemicals across the U.S. Canada and European countries). See also SHEILA
JASANOFF, Science and Norms in Global EnvironmentalRegimes, in EARTHLY GOODS: ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 179-80 (Fen Osler Hampson & Judith Reppy eds.,
1996) (asserting that cultural differences influence the perception of risk and thus shape how
regulatory managers respond in addressing risks).
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